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The motivation of the current work, framed under the safety EUROfusion activities to develop DEMO, is to 
present the conclusions drawn from our contribution to the safety studies of the HCPB DEMO carried out by the 
team tasked with AINA code development. During 2016 and 2017 a new AINA version was built in order to evaluate 
plasma evolution and in-vessel components strains inside the European DEMO designs. As a result, AINA is able to 
foresee several accident scenarios as plasma disruptions or structural meltings due to LOPCs (Loss Of Plasma 
Control) and in-vessel melt either of FW, blanket structure and/or divertor modules because of thermal stresses due 
to LOCAs. After due analysis, it has concluded that it would be desirable to carry out a design review focused on 
ensuring a suitable operating temperature range with a bigger safety margin for all the materials which make up the 
HCPB BB, as well as the need to guarantee a quick detection and actuation by means of a proper system, depending 
on the affected equipment, when the most demanding transients take place which may drive the reactor to melting 
scenarios and very energetic plasma disruptions. These events include an increase of fueling above 50%, a permanent 
improvement in the confinement time and a punctual impurity increase above 300%. Other perturbations has been 
studied which provide information on non-dangerous cases, impossible situations or melting processes. 
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1. Introduction 
The safety and environmental goals of a fusion power 
plant design are to protect workers from radiation, 
electromagnetic fields, chemical and other hazards; the 
public from radioactive and toxic materials and the 
environment from pollutants and waste. A conclusion that 
can be drawn from the historical safety analyses 
developed for tokamaks is that some of the major risks 
involve incidents in the vacuum vessel and during the last 
ten years AINA has become a great tool in order to 
evaluate plasma evolution and these in-vessel 
components strains [1-6]. The Blanket is a safety relevant 
component since its failure could impact the operation of 
other components, most notably the vacuum vessel. 
Moreover, the Blanket is credited for some interlock 
functions such as neutron shielding to the magnets that 
may affect the dose to the workers during maintenance 
operations, and hence its design could impact the overall 
safety of the machine. Thus, this contribution to the 
HCPB safety studies is faced to figure out if the in vessel 
components fulfill the safety functions and to foresee the 
possible consequences if these functions are not satisfied. 
Firstly, it is important to highlight that the tool used to 
perform this study, AINA 4.0, has been properly validated 
[7, 8] and the modeled Blanket is the HCPB-2015 v3 [9]. 
 
2. Steady State 
The steady state scenario used to develop the safety 
study was presented in the previous AINA team’s paper 
[7] and based on the reference scenario DEMO1 [10]. It 
is necessary to remember that for the DEMO1 scenario 
certain functional temperature limits for the HCPB BB 
design are slightly exceeded in the worst poloidal region 
(EUROFER: 563 ºC, Beryllium: 677 ºC and LiSiO4: 956 
ºC). These values are slightly different from previous 
paper ones due to and improvement in the thermal blanket 
model. Accordingly, it would be advisable to undertake a 
design review focused on ensuring a suitable operating 
temperature for materials which make up the blanket [7]. 
 
3. Transients 
3.1 Types of accidents 
Common objective of the FFMEAs done for the 
various DEMO systems was, at first, to provide a 
complete list of potential accident initiating events (IEs). 
Among those, the Selection of reference accident 
scenarios for the DEMO plant document [11] has 
identified 21 PIEs (Postulated Initiating Events) as the 
most representative for the deterministic assessments to 
be performed in the first phase of the DEMO design 
activities both to check the compliance with safety limits 
and to give rationales for the selection of the reference 
DEMO reactor model. The vast majority of these 21 PIEs 
could induce the following load or accident scenarios 
which AINA is able to simulate: 
 Plasma disruption or structural material melting 
due to a LOPC (Loss Of Plasma Control): 
disruptions represent the highest risk for DEMO 
integrity and it is assumed that they are only 
caused by instabilities induced by failures in the 
systems operating to confine, diagnose and feed 
the plasma or by accidental events leading to the 
entrance of undesired elements. By means of 
AINA, it is possible to identify those failures 
which lead to the maximum wall damage due to 
the electromagnetic and thermal load. Likewise, 
some failures cannot lead the plasma to a 
disruption event, however this perturbation can 
 
affect the plasma physics and damage structural 
materials. The perturbations that AINA can 
simulate are failures in the external power system 
and in the fuel system, changes in the confinement 
time and an undesired entrance of impurities. 
 In-vessel melt either of FW, blanket structure 
and/or divertor modules because of thermal 
stresses due to a LOCA: AINA is able to replicate 
this phenomena by means of the variation of the 
coolant mass flow rate through the cooling 
sections while the reactor stills working. 
 
3.2 Failure in the external power supply system 
An unexpected and instantaneous auxiliary heating 
cut-off while the HCPB DEMO reactor is operating on 
DEMO1 steady state causes a fast decrease of ion and 
electron temperatures and a confinement time rise. All of 
this converges at a new steady state which produces a 
higher fusion power (Pfus) of 2420 MW. So, apparently 
the ignition point has been achieved, however the increase 
of neutronic heat flux (NWL) through the blanket induces 
the overtaking of the functional temperature limits wider 
than in the DEMO1 state in less than 10 s (LiSiO4: 1031 
ºC, Beryllium: 700 ºC and EUROFER: 565 ºC). For this 
reason it is necessary to conclude that it is really important 
to detect rapidly an external power cut-off in order to 
proceed with a fast plasma shutdown (FPSS) during the 
first seconds for the purpose of preventing, specifically, 
LiSiO4 and Beryllium melting. 
An analogous and scaled sequence to the previous one 
takes place when an unexpected and sudden decrease of 
auxiliary heating takes place. In short, any auxiliary 
heating reduction must be detected instantly in order to 
proceed with a FPSS to avoid the BB material collapse. 
If the reactor suffers an unexpected and sudden 
increase of auxiliary heating there are two situations. 
When the increase is up to a multiplication factor of 6.3 
the reactor is driven to an initial and abrupt fusion power 
increment although it finally decreases rapidly achieving 
a new state which produces less fusion power than 
DEMO1 and where the functional temperature limits of 
the BB materials are closer to the accepted ones. When 
the increase by a multiplication factor is larger than 6.3 
the plasma terminates disruptively due to the beta limit 
infringement. The higher multiplication factor is, the 
faster plasma collapse is. At the time of the disruption, the 
plasma thermal energy (U) (estimated by Paknezhad 
expression (1) [12] where Z indicates the plasma species, 
nz is the specie density, Tz is the temperature density and 
V is the plasma volume) is 1.5 GJ. Consequently the 
EUROFER limit of 550 ºC would be significantly 




∑ 𝑛𝑍𝑇𝑍𝑉 𝑍    (1) 
Nevertheless and in spite of these consequences, it is 
highly unlikely to achieve auxiliary heating as high as 
those which can lead to this final kind of accident due to 
the installed external power would not exceed 150 MW. 






0  Stabilized FPSS Pfus increase/ 
melting 
0.5 Stabilized FPSS Pfus increase/ 
melting 
2 Stabilized - Pfus decrease 
5 Stabilized - Pfus decrease 
6.4 Beta limit at 
88.5 s 
FPSS Melting by 
excessive U 
9 Beta limit at 
2 s 
FPSS Melting by 
excessive U 
 
3.3 Failure in the fuel source system 
In case fueling is stopped, it is possible to observe how 
Pfus quickly diminish as well as densities, except the 
impurities percentages due to physical sputtering driven 
by the increase in ion and electron temperature. All of this 
leads to a reduction in BB temperatures reaching 
acceptable values far below the limits. Unfortunately, a 
transition L mode is detected after 22.9 s and, finally, 
plasma collapses at 25.5 s by an overshoot beta limit 
disruption. Despite this, at the time of the collapse, the U 
achieves values of up to 0.5 GJ. This released energy 
could be mitigated by a disruption mitigation system and, 
thereby, the BB material would be safeguarded. 
A fueling reduction leads to a fusion power decrease, 
specifically half of fueling provides just over half the 
initial Pfus (from 2037 MW to 1141 MW). The 
confinement time gets stabilized during the first seconds 
and material temperatures are greatly reduced even almost 
below the functional temperature limits. In conclusion, 
beyond this failure does not cause a dangerous scenario, 
the new steady state obtained could be a better candidate 
for DEMO operation from the point of view of 
temperature limits no exceedance and despite the 
generation of lower Pfus and, consequently, less gain. 
If an unexpected and sudden increase of fueling rate 
up to 25% a new steady state scenario is achieved as in 
the previous case. However this one is not positive and 
several risks are derived from this kind of perturbation 
since Pfus expands as well as confinement time and 
densities. All of this leads to a scenario where functional 
temperature limits are widely exceeded in less than 50 s 
and the melting is unmitigated (LiSiO4: 1212 ºC, 
Beryllium: 764 ºC and EUROFER: 572.5 ºC for a rate up 
of 25%). Hence, it is essential to be able to guarantee a 
quick detection and actuation (FPSS) in order to stop the 
excessive warming. 
When an unexpected and sudden increase of fueling 
rate is above 25%, Pfus, densities and confinement time are 
continuously growing until a Greenwald limit disruption 
takes place with a high U (> 1 GJ). The higher fueling rate 
multiplication factor is, the earlier collapse happens. In 
short, it is necessary to detect an increase of fueling 
rapidly and activate a fast plasma shutdown (FPSS) since 
all these perturbations cause structural damage. 
 











0.5 Stabilized - New and 
better SS 
1.25 Stabilized FPSS Pfus increase/ 
melting 
2 Greenwald 
limit at 74.7 s 
FPSS Melting by 
excessive U 
6 Greenwald 
limit at 1.7 s 
FPSS Melting by 
excessive U 
 
3.4 Variations in the confinement time 
Historically, AINA has been used in safety analyses to 
scan the influence of an increase in confinement time [3, 
6, 13] owing to the H mode discovery occurred on 4th 
February 1982. Following this path, at first, the behavior 
of plasma parameters in case of a permanent increase of 
confinement time will be simulated and discussed. 
Confinement time improvement produces a fast 
increase of temperatures as well as densities, which drive 
to an overall raise of Pfus until plasma terminates 
disruptively due to the beta limit infringement. The U 
discharged during the disruption cause structural damage 
and melting in any case, hence, it is necessary to detect 
instantaneously an unexpected variation in confinement 
time with the aim of conducing the reactor to a FPSS. 











1.5  31.7 2.4 4708 1475 
2 5.5 2.4 4905 1432 
3 3.7 2.4 5332 1408 
5 3 2.4 5565 1388 
 
On the other hand a punctual confinement time 
variation may happen due to an unexpected behavior 
during the operation time. The impact of these events is 
highly dependent on the duration of the confinement time 
variation and it does not depend so much on the variation 
factor suffered. Therefore, when the confinement time 
rises abruptly but decreases after 0.1 s, the effects are not 
severe since both a multiplication factor of 3 and 10 
excites the plasma but the initial steady state is recovered 
in less than 20 s. During this transition an instantaneous 
Pfus peak is reached due to a fast increase of ion and 
electron temperatures, as well as the BB materials 
temperatures rise slightly but they are stabilized rapidly. 
In case the duration of the confinement time variation is 
longer, the steady state is recovered whilst the 
perturbation disappears before the corresponding 
termination time tracked down in the previous section 
with the exception of the perturbation lasts more than a 
boundary value (~3 s) where the plasma may collapse due 
to the Greenwald limit. In these cases and in spite of the 
recovery, the longer the duration of the perturbation is the 
grater maximum temperatures are achieved and it is 
highly probable that the reactor suffers a melting 
situation. In view of these circumstances, it is necessary 
to detect an unexpected variation in confinement time. 
 
3.5 Entrance of an undesired quantity of impurities 
When the reactor is operating, a flux of particles enter 
the plasma as impurities due to the erosion phenomena 
which is inherent to the nature of plasma wall interaction. 
It can be cause of several undesirable effects as a Plasma 
Facing Components damage or beneficial effects as 
shutting down the fusion due to an increase of 
Bremsstrahlung and line radiation, becoming a passive 
safety mechanism, for instance, if a LOCA takes place. 
For these reasons the consequences of an undesired 
quantity of impurities must be studied. 
A punctual increase of the impurities presence (Xe and 
W) up to 300% produces a sudden rise of confinement 
time, Pfus, power losses (Bremsstrahlung and line 
radiation); a decrease of temperatures and, after a few 
seconds, the achievement of dangerous melting 
temperatures on the BB materials. A recovery of the initial 
steady state takes place after 20 seconds; however, the 
detection of this kind of perturbation and a FPSS must be 
fast since, as noted, the material temperatures rise rapidly. 
A punctual increase of the impurities presence (Xe and 
W) equal to 300% differs from the previous case, the 
plasma equilibrium is not recovered and plasma skips 
instantaneous to the L mode where Pfus grows until a peak 
of 4365 MW. Consequently, the temperature in the BB 
rises rapidly (LiSiO4: 1395 ºC, Beryllium: 771 ºC, 
EUROFER: 572 ºC and Tungsten: 534.8 ºC). Densities 
are continuously growing until a Greenwald limit 
disruption takes place at 12 s releasing a U of 1.8 GJ 
which can damage the reactor structure. So, it is necessary 
to detect this event rapidly and lead the reactor to a FPSS. 
Finally, if an increase of the Tungsten impurity 
production takes place, Pfus, densities and confinement 
time are continuously and slowly growing and depending 
on the new impurity production rate the plasma may reach 
a new steady state or it might collapse by means of the 
Greenwald limit. Nevertheless, any alternative is not 
instantaneous, so the incident detection must be previous 
to the endpoint in order to prevent a melting scenario. 
 
3.6 LOCAs 
Firstly, it is important to remember that AINA’s 
LOCAs are based on the variation of the coolant mass 
flow rate through the cooling sections while the reactor 
stills working and not after a reactor shut down. 
From AINA outcomes, it concludes that this kind of 
failure inside the cooling system does not affect the 
internal plasma conditions but, undoubtedly, even a slight 
loss of the mass flow (about 30%), leads the reactor to an 
overall melting scenario rapidly since the material 
temperatures increase drastically during the first seconds 
after the cooling channel rupture. Specifically, the most 
demanded area is the LiSiO4 layer due to its lower thermal 
conductivity and a big distance from the cooling channel 
 
lines, consequently, the effect of the convention is less 
effective than in the other layers. For this reason, it is 
indispensable the installation of a quick response system 
capable of detecting a cooling anomaly rapidly and 
activating a proper mitigation action such as a FPSS. 
 
Fig. 1. T Evolution of the BB if a 30% BB LOCA occurs. 
 
Fig. 2. T Evolution of the BB if a 60% BB LOCA occurs. 
 
4. Conclusions 
After due analysis, it has concluded that it would be 
desirable to carry out a possible design review to ensure 
suitable operating temperatures for all the materials which 
make up the HCPB BB, as well as the need to guarantee a 
quick detection and actuation by means of a proper 
system, depending on the affected equipment, when the 
most demanding transients take place which may drive the 
reactor to suffer a melting scenario and a very energetic 
plasma disruption at the same time. These events include 
an increase of fueling injection above 50%, a permanent 
improvement in the confinement time and a punctual 
impurity increase above 300%. Other perturbations has 
been studied, which some of them only provide 
information on non-dangerous cases as a decrease of the 
fueling injection, impossible situations from a technical 
point of view as an unexpected and sudden increase of 
external power above 630% or melting processes as 
LOCAs or a decrease of the external power injection. 
 
5. Future Work 
On the basis of this HCPB study, future tasks will be 
focused on the development of the DCLL, HCLL and 
WCLL contributions to safety analyses using AINA 4.0. 
This work has been carried out within the framework 
of the EUROfusion Consortium and has received funding 
from the Euratom research and training programme 2014-
2018 under grant agreement No 633053. The views and 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those 
of the European Commission. 
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